This article considers the problem of utility maximization with an uncertain covariance matrix. In contrast with the classical uncertain parameter approach, where the parameters of the model evolve within a given range, we constrain them by penalization. We show that this robust optimization process can be interpreted as a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game. We prove that the value function satisfies the Dynamic Programming Principle and that it is the unique viscosity solution of an associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation. We derive an analytical solution in the logarithmic utility case and obtain accurate numerical approximations in the general case by two methods: finite differences and Monte Carlo simulation.
Introduction
This paper addresses the problem of continuous time utility maximization. Besides the choice of utility function, the key element in the formulation of such a problem is the a priori knowledge assumed about the evolution of the underlying assets (e.g., expected return and covariance for a diffusion process). In a landmark paper, Merton (1969) found an explicit solution for the optimal portfolio selection and consumption strategy, for a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function X γ γ , γ ∈ (0, 1) (a.k.a. power utility or isoelastic utility). He found that the optimal fraction of the wealth to be invested in the risky asset was given by π * = µ−r σ 2 (1−γ) 1 , therefore independent of both time and wealth, although this quantity is a priori allowed to evolve dynamically. This conclusion is arguably one of the most classical results in portfolio optimization (note, by the way, the consistency with Markowitz portfolio optimization Markowitz (1952) ). It has led to various extensions, and some of them are illustrated in the textbook by Rogers (2013) .
In the original Merton problem, the evolution of the risky asset, although stochastic by essence, is governed by the Black-Scholes model (Black and Scholes, 1973) with fixed parameters µ, r and σ. This is a very simplified model for the actual asset price. Stochastic models (for the volatility and interest rates) that describe the price evolution more realistically have later emerged. Several papers have addressed the problem in this context, Matoussi et al. (2015) treat the case of stochastic volatility, and Rogers (2013) addresses the case of stochastic interest rates. The expected return (or drift) µ plays an essential role in the optimal allocation; even when it is considered stochastic, it is still assumed to be observable. This assumption clearly does not match the reality that investors are facing. Several works by Lakner (1995) and then Bel Hadj Ayed et al. (2017) address the utility maximization problem with an uncertain drift (however assuming some form of the prescribed dynamics or prior distribution of the drift).
Two decades ago, the concept of robust portfolio optimization has emerged. It was first introduced in the operations research literature by El Ghaoui and Lebret (1997) and Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (1998) . Instead of assuming a model with a known drift, interest rate or volatility, the robust optimal allocation strategy assumes that they will evolve dynamically in the most unfavourable way within a given range. The resulting allocation process tends to be more stable and less vulnerable to changes in model parameters.
There has been a substantial amount of literature on robust portfolio optimization over the last decade and the area is still developing. A comprehensive introduction of the trends and methods can be found in the book by Fabozzi et al. (2007) . Gabrel et al. (2014) provided an overview of advances in robust optimization, including but not limited to applications in finance, where they stated that "robustifying" stochastic optimization is one of the key developments that should happen following the 2007 financial crisis. We list below a few pieces of research influential to us. For instance, Elliott and Siu (2009) supposed that an agent wants to maximize the minimal utility function, over a family of probability measures. This problem was then formulated as a Markovian regime-switching model, where the market parameters are modulated by a continuous-time finite-state Markov chain, and the Markov chain is determined by the probability measure. Glasserman and Xu (2013) went beyond parameter uncertainties to consider the effect of changes in the probability law that defines an underlying model. They used relative entropy to quantify the deviation of the worst-case model from the baseline model. Fouque et al. (2016) studied an asset allocation problem with stochastic volatility and uncertain correlation and derived closed-form solutions for a class of utility functions. Ismail and Pham (2019) studied a robust Markowitz portfolio selection problem under covariance uncertainty. The value function is obtained by optimizing the worst-case mean-variance functional, over admissible investing strategies α. They then solved this problem by McKean-Vlasov dynamic programming approach and characterized the solution with a Bellman-Isaacs PDE. They also illustrated the robust efficient frontier in two examples: uncertain volatilities and uncertain correlation. Last but not least, we also mention the work by Talay and Zheng (2002) , which studied the robust optimization problem in the context of derivatives hedging.
A robust investment process can be interpreted as a two-player game. On the one hand, the market can be thought of as an evil player controlling the volatility (or the drift) so as to minimize the gains of the investor, on the other hand, the agent, who controls the allocation of the wealth, is trying to maximize her gains under the worst possible behaviour of the market. The two controllers have conflicting interests, the gain of one player being a loss for the other. Hence we call this competition between the investor and the market a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game (SDG). Differential games were first introduced by Isaacs (1965) ; the book by Fleming and Soner (2006) serves as a concise introduction to the theory of viscosity solutions and deterministic zero-sum differential games. The first complete theory for two-player zero-sum SDG was developed by Fleming and Souganidis (1989) , where they proved the existence of value functions of the games. Buckdahn and Li (2008) generalized the results of Fleming and Souganidis (1989) by considering the gain functional as a solution to a Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (BSDE). With the help of BSDE methods, they proved the Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP) for the value functions in a more straightforward approach.
The main novelty of this work is that we do not assume a given range of parameters in the evolution of the underlying state (the set E in the aforementioned problems). Instead, we allow the parameters to move freely and use a penalty function F = F (r, µ, σ, . . .) to act against unrealistic values of the parameters. Mathematically speaking, the penalty function gives some coercivity to the problem so that an optimal point can be found. This approach has been used for robust derivatives pricing in Tan et al. (2013) and Guo et al. (2017) . Note that one can asymptotically recover the fixed parameter range approach aforementioned, by taking the penalty function F to be 0 over a given set and +∞ outside.
The problem studied in this paper belongs to the area of stochastic differential games. In the classical papers studying two-player zero-sum SDG, Fleming and Souganidis (1989) and Nisio (2015) made the assumptions that the domain is bounded and the utility function U is bounded and Lipschitz continuous. They then proved that the DPP holds for the lower-and upper-value functions, and these two value functions are the unique viscosity solutions to the lower and upper Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) equations respectively. The present paper extends these results to more general assumptions by considering an unbounded domain and an unbounded utility function U . We also prove the equality of the lower-and upper-value of the SDG (1)-(2).
Finally, we establish an explicit analytical solution for the logarithmic utility function and numerical results by PDE and Monte Carlo methods for general utility functions, for which analytical solutions are unavailable. In particular, it is, to our knowledge, the first application of the control randomization method (see Kharroubi et al. (2014) ) in the context of a robust portfolio optimization problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate a portfolio optimization problem in a robust setting and introduce the uncertain drift and uncertain volatility processes. For the following sections, we only focus on the uncertain volatility case. In Section 3, we introduce the value functions defined in differential games and two-player zero-sum SDG. In Section 4 we show that the differential game has a saddle point and as a consequence, there exists a value for both the differential game and two-player zero-sum SDG. We prove that the value function satisfies the DPP in Section 5 and that our value function is the unique viscosity solution of an HJBI equation in Section 6. In Section 7, we derive a closed-form solution for the logarithmic utility (section 7.1), and provide simulation results for general utility functions using numerical PDE techniques (section 7.2) and Monte Carlo simulations (section 7.3).
Problem Formulation
We consider a portfolio with d risky assets and one risk-free asset compounding at a constant interest rate r ∈ R. The price process of the risky assets is denoted as
, and the ith element of S t follows the dynamics
with drift µ t ∈ R d , covariance matrix Σ t ∈ R d×d and its square-root matrix σ t := Σ 1 2 t ∈ R d×m . W is an m-dimensional Brownian motion on a filtered probability space Ω, F, F = (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P ; the processes µ t and Σ t are progressively measurable with respect to F.
Let X t ∈ R be the value of the portfolio at time t. A portfolio allocation strategy α t ∈ R d represents the proportion of total wealth the agent invests in the d risky assets at time t, and 1 − d i=1 α t (i) is the proportion invested in the risk-free asset.
Assuming the strategy is self financed, the wealth process evolves as follows
We define r := r × 1 with 1 ∈ R d being a d-dimensional all-ones vector. The wealth evolution can be rewritten as
We define the payoff function as the expectation of a terminal utility function U plus a penalty function F :
where E t,x stands for the conditional expectation given the initial time and wealth (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R. Our objective is to find the optimal portfolio allocation process α so as to maximize the minimal payoff function given by the drift process µ or covariance process Σ. Throughout the paper, F will be a convex function in Σ s and µ s . We introduce now the concept of admissible control. Definition 1. An admissible control process Σ (resp. µ) for the market on [t, T ] is a progressively measurable process with respect to F, taking values in a compact convex set B ⊂ R d×d (resp. M ⊂ R d ), where B is a set of symmetric positive semi-definite matrices. The set of all admissible Σ (resp. µ) on [t, T ] is compact and convex, denoted by B (resp. M).
Definition 2. An admissible control process α for the investor on [t, T ] is a progressively measurable process with respect to F, taking values in a compact convex set A ⊂ R d . The set of all admissible α is compact and convex, denoted by A.
Robust value functions
We are now ready to define the value functions. In this case, the covariance (or drift) is unknown, it is another control besides α. We want to find the optimal portfolio allocation process that maximizes the worst-case situation given by the covariance (or drift). Then, given an initial condition (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R, the value function is defined as
We sayα andΣ,μ are optimal controls ifv(t, x) = J(t, x,α,Σ,μ) = inf Σ∈B,µ∈M J(t, x,α, Σ, µ).
Hereafter, we focus on the robust optimization problem with an uncertain covariance, that is,
The uncertain drift case can be studied in a similar manner.
Assumptions
In this section, we make the following assumptions which will hold throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. U : R → R is a continuous, increasing and concave function such that
where Q(|x| , |x|) is a polynomial function.
Assumption 2. F : B → R is a continuous convex function, and F attains its minimum in the interior of B.
Assumption 3. For any Σ s,s∈[t,T ] ∈ B and α s,s∈[t,T ] ∈ A, we have
and for any fixed value x 0 ,
3 Value functions of two-player zero-sum stochastic differential games
The problem described in Section 2 is a differential game, and the value function defined in (3) is the lower value of the game. If we reverse the moving order of the two players, we get the upper value of this gameū
However, this differential game is more suitable for analyzing single-period processes, because instantaneous switches of Σ and α are possible in continuous time (Fleming and Soner, 2006) . To overcome this difficulty, Fleming and Souganidis (1989) adopted the idea of a progressive strategy in a two-player zero-sum SDG, which is defined as:
Definition 3. An admissible strategy Γ (resp. ∆) for the investor (resp. market) on [t, T ] is a mapping Γ : B → A (resp. ∆ : A → B ) such that, if, for any s ∈ [t, T ] and Σ,Σ ∈ B (resp. α,α ∈ A),
The set of all admissible strategies for the investor (resp. market) on [t, T ] is denoted by N (resp. M).
Then another two value functions are defined, the upper value function of the two-player zero-sum SDG reads:
and the corresponding lower value function is
4 Existence of a value for the differential games
In this section, we prove that there exists a value for the differential game, i.e.,v(t, x) =ū(t, x). Firstly, we need to point out that Proposition 1. The four value functions defined in Section 2 and Section 3 satisfy the following relation:
Proof. The inequality u(t, x) ≤ū(t, x) is because M contains a copy of B, andv(t, x) ≤ v(t, x) as N contains a copy of A. Then for all α ∈ A and > 0, there exists a∆ such that
In addition to u(t, x) ≤ v(t, x) (we will prove this inequality in Corollary 2), we get inequality (8).
Proposition 2. Let U be a continuous, increasing and concave utility function on R, and Assumption 2 holds, thenv(t,
Proof. First of all, we establish a non-robust value function w(t,
where we assume the volatility σ s for s ∈ [t, T ] is a fixed known constant and all the previous settings for α, U, X t are kept the same here. An argument used in Pham (2009, Chapter 3.6) proved that, when the utility function U (·) is continuous, increasing and concave on R, w(t, ·) is also increasing and concave in x, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
For any arbitraryΣ ∈ B, we define a value function a q(t, x) as
We know q(t, x) is a viscosity solution of the HJB equation
We define
It is obvious that
The value function q
which is equivalent to ∂q ∂t
due to the saddle point property (9). With a proof similar to Pham (2009, Chapter 4) , a value func-
ds is the unique viscosity solution of the HJB (10). Therefore we have
Then the inequality
, we finally get the equality of the four valuesv
With Proposition 2, we can make a conclusion that there exists a value for the differential game, and this value coincides with the value of the two-player zero-sum SDG. We focus on the analysis of v(t, x) in the following sections.
Dynamic Programming Principle
If the drift and volatility functions of dynamics (1) and the utility function U were bounded and U was Lipschitz continuous, we could have applied the results in Fleming and Souganidis (1989) directly. However, in our model, x is unbounded and U is only locally Lipschitz continuous. So we slightly extend the classical results and use localization techniques to prove that the value function v(t, x) defined in (6) satisfies the Dynamic Programming Principle. DPP is widely used in numerical methods, such as Regression Monte Carlo. This section is a modification of the proof by Talay and Zheng (2002) .
Before we mention the main result, we prove an important property of the value function.
Proposition 3. Let Assumptions 1 and 3 hold true. Then the value function v(t, x) (6) is locally Lipchitz continuous w.r.t x. There exists a positive polynomial function Φ such that
Proof. Let X T andX T be the solutions of the SDE (1) with initial states x andx at time t. From assumption 1, for an arbitrary pair of admissible control and strategy, we have
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
With the classical estimates, there exist constants C, m 1 , m 2 and β 0 such that
With the inequality E max t≤s≤T X s 2m ≤ C T (1 + x 2m ) , we have
where C T , m are constants, and Φ is a polynomial function.
Then we want to apply the arguments: for all bounded functions E λ 0
sup
Under Assumptions 1 and 3, we have v(t, x) being bounded. Then we can write the difference between the two value functions as:
Therefore the value function v(t, x) is locally Lipschitz continuous in x.
We are now in the position to present a main result in this paper.
Theorem 1. Dynamic Programming Principle.
Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold true. Define the value function v(t, x) as (6) for
Proof. We use localization techniques here. Let B k = {x ∈ R, x 2 < k 2 }, we define a function φ k (x) in a way such that φ k (x) = 1 on B k , and φ k (x) = 0 outside B k+1 . Then we can write a new SDE
Let U k (x) = φ k+2 (x)U (x), then we can define the truncated value function as
In the above setting, the drift and volatility functions in the SDE (17) are bounded, and the utility function in (18) is bounded and Lipschitz continuous. As all the assumptions of Fleming and Souganidis (1989) are satisfied, the localized value function v k defined in (18) satisfies that, for t ≤ t + θ ≤ T ,
We can see that as k → ∞, v k (t, x) in (18) approaches v(t, x) in (6), then our problem reduces to prove that the right hand side of (19) converges to the right hand side of (16).
If (20) is zero. For the second term (21), we have
Finally our task is to show that the upper bound (22) converges to zero as k goes to infinity. Using the result from Proposition 3, there exists a polynomial Φ such that
and the Markov inequality yields
where C T , m are constants independent of k. Therefore for an arbitrary pair (Γ, Σ), we have
where K( x , T ) is a polynomial function in terms of x and T .
As k → ∞, the term (21) goes to zero as well, then we can state
as the left and right hand sides of (19) converge to the left and right hand sides of equation (16) respectively.
As a consequence of the DPP, we have the following property of the value function.
Corollary 1. Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold true. Then the value function v(t, x) defined in (6) is continuous in t on [0, T ].
Proof. By the Dynamic Programming Principle, for t < s < T,
where X t,x s is the solution of the SDE (1) starting from x at t, with the pair of optimal control and strategyΣ,Γ. For an arbitrary pair of (Γ, Σ), there exist a polynomial function Q and constants C T , m such that
where Φ(|x|) is a polynomial being independent of s − t. Then we conclude that v(t, x) is continuous in
6 Viscosity solution of the HJBI equation
In this section, we prove that the value function is the unique viscosity solution of an Hamilton-JacobiBellman-Isaacs equation. In 6.1, we prove the existence of the viscosity solution, and we state the uniqueness of this viscosity solution in 6.2.
Existence of a viscosity solution of the HJBI Equation
Now we state another main result in this paper, the proof is a modification of Talay and Zheng (2002) .
Theorem 2. Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold true. Then the value function v(t, x) defined in (6) is a viscosity solution of the HJBI equation
where
Proof. We keep using the localized X k t , U k and v k from the proof of Theorem 1 in Section 5. The HJBI equation associated with SDE (17) is
(28) All the assumptions in Fleming and Souganidis (1989) are satisfied, so v k (t, x) (18) is a viscosity solution of the HJBI equation (27).
Now we establish another value function
In the first case where x ∈ B k+1 , we have X k T 2 < (k + 2) 2 almost surely. Thereforē
Since the dynamics of X t is zero outside of B k+1 , then X k T = x and
To summarize the above two cases, we get
Since H k → H as k → ∞, if we can provev k → v as k → ∞, then it shows that v is a viscosity solution of equation (25). We will prove the convergence in the following way: first of all, we have
For any arbitrary pair of control and strategy,
Using Assumption 1, we can write
Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality on the upper bound (31), with similar arguments as before, we get
Hence
where Φ(|x|) is a polynomial function independent of k. Combining (30), (31) and (33), we deduce that
We can then state thatv k converges to v as k → ∞. Thus v is a viscosity solution of the HJBI equation (25).
Comparison Principle for the HJBI Equation
In the following part, we state the comparison principle for equation (34) 
Let U (resp. V ) be a u.s.c. viscosity subsolution (resp. l.s.c. supersolution) with polynomial growth condition to equation
As a consequence of the comparison principle, the value function v(t, x) (6) is actually the unique viscosity solution of the HJBI equation (25).
Corollary 2. Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold true. Define the lower and upper value functions of the two-player zero-sum SDG as (7) and (6). Then
Proof.
From Theorem 2 we know v(t, x) is a viscosity solution of the HJBI equation (25). Let
Using the viscosity supersolution property of v(t, x), we have
(35) It is obvious that H ≥H, so
Thus v(t, x) is a supersolution of the HJBI equation
With the results in Fleming and Souganidis (1989) and a similar argument, we can prove the lower value function u(t, x) (7) is the unique viscosity solution of the HJBI equation
By Theorem 3 we have u(t, x) ≤ v(t, x).
Numerical results
In this section, we provide one-dimensional numerical examples for the most common utility functions. We give out an analytical solution for the Logarithmic utility, and we approximate the value functions for Logarithmic and CRRA functions with the implicit finite difference method and the control randomization method respectively.
Analytical Solution
In the first example, we consider U (x) = ln(x) and the penalty function F (σ 2 t ) = (σ t − σ 0 ) 2 . It is possible to find an explicit solution for the value function and the optimal controls in this case. Writing X T explicitly, the value function becomes:
(37) To find the optimal α s and σ 2 s , we can differentiate instantaneously the integrand α s (µ−r)+r
2 with respect to α s and σ 2 s respectively. Then we get the following relations:
which give us a quartic equation
The optimalσ s can be solved from equation (40) explicitly; we provide the solution in Appendix 1. If we substitute the optimal controls into (37), we can get the analytical solution of the value function. From equations (38)- (39), we observe that the optimal volatility and investment strategy at each instant are both constants, being independent of the wealth X s or the time s. The classical optimal portfolio strategy given by Merton is also a constant, where α * = µ−r σ 2 (1−γ) for CRRA utility functions. However, in our problem, it is not possible to find an analytical solution for a power function. We will use numerical simulations to estimate the values in the following parts.
We compare a robust value function Figure (1) . We use the optimal controlsα s ,σ s calculated from (38)-(39) for the robust value, and an estimated constant volatility σ 0 for Merton's value. It is not surprising to see that the robust value is always below Merton's value, since we trade portfolio performance for robustness. Figure (1a) shows that as the estimated volatility σ 0 increases, the robust value approaches the non-robust value, because the solution to equation (40) gets close to σ 0 as σ 0 gets large. In figure (1b) , as the penalization gets stronger,σ s is forced to get closer to σ 0 , hence the robust value asymptotically approaches Merton's value. When λ 0 → 0, the malevolent volatilityσ s is extremely large, as it lies on the upper bound of the set B. It means it is very risky to invest in stocks and it is wiser to save money in the bank account, sô α s → 0 and U (X T ) → U (xe rT ). We set x = 1, r = 0.015, T = 1, then this value goes to 0.015 as shown on the lower left corner of figure (1b). 
Implicit Finite Difference Method
In section 7.2 and 7.3, we use the penalty function F (σ
2 for simplicity. Thus the HJBI equation is
where the Hamiltonian is defined as
Solving for the optimal controls in (42) with the first order condition, we getα t = − Since the PDE (41) is non-linear, it requires more techniques to solve numerically. We first use a Legendre transformation to reduce H(t, x, v x , v xx ) to a linear function in v xx and then apply an implicit finite difference method directly. This method was also used by Jonsson and Sircar (2002a,b) to solve nonlinear HJB equations. However, we combine the linearization step with a fixed-point iteration scheme.
Define H * as the Legendre transformation of H; it is given here by
. In this way, we can represent H(v xx ) as a linear function of v xx ,
It is hard to check the condition for stability in our PDE since the optimal a is unknown. Fortunately, implicit finite difference methods have a weaker requirement for stability than explicit finite difference methods.
We set the time grid as 0, 1, ..., n, n + 1, ..., N , and the spatial grid as 1, 2, ...i, i + 1, ...M . With a maturity T = 1, we use a constant time step ∆t = forward approximation for v t , a central approximation for v x , and a standard approximation for v xx . In an implicit scheme working backward, at each time step n, we need to look for the optimalâ in (43) by solving the first order condition v
Although we do not have the true values for v n , we can use a fixed-point iteration to find the solution of equation (44). As the values v n depend onâ, we can represent equation (44) asâ = f (â). First we make an initial guessâ 0 using the known values v n+1 , then iteratively generate a sequenceâ k,k=1,2,... withâ k = f (â k−1 ) untilâ k converges. Here we claim the following without a proof: Remark 1. Convergence to a fixed point. There exists a fixed point such thatâ = f (â). Letâ k = f (â k−1 ), k = 1, 2..., then we have lim k→∞âk =â for any initial guessâ 0 .
Finally we can substitute the discrete approximations of the derivatives into the HJBI equation (41), and we obtain the implicit form:
Let B be the coefficient matrix, K n the value vector at time n and F n+1 the right hand side of (45). Equation (45) can be written in a matrix notation:
The algorithm for this method is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Implicit Finite Difference Scheme For step n = N : 1 : 
Logarithmic Utility Function
In this example, we use a logarithmic utility function and the penalty function F (σ
The terminal condition is given as the utility function,
We can write the upper boundary condition v(t n , x 1 ) for n ∈ [0, N − 1] and lower boundary condition v(t n , x M ) for n ∈ [0, N − 1] explicitly:
Figure (2) shows the numerical results of v(t, x) for a range of initial wealth x. Comparing with the analytical solution, we can see that the two curves completely overlap, which validates the accuracy of the PDE approach. 
Power Utility Function
In the second example, we use a power utility function. This time, we only have the terminal condition and the upper boundary condition when x 1 = 0, but not the lower boundary condition for a large x M .
For functions x γ (γ < 1, γ = 0), the limit of the first order derivative approaches 0 as x goes to infinity. Therefore we can use a zero Neumann boundary condition as the lower boundary condition when x M is large. Then we have the following three boundary conditions: T and parameters µ = 0.035, r = 0.015, λ 0 = 10. We only display the estimated curve, as there is no analytical solution available in this example. Figure (3b) shows the first four iterations of the estimatedâ from an initial guess. There is little change visible, and convergence to a fixed value is usually achieved in less than 4 iterations.
This subsection has shown that the PDE method converges to the true value efficiently. Nevertheless, some shortcomings of this approach motivate the set up of alternative numerical methods:
• The PDE approach requires tedious algebraic manipulation before implementation. In particular, even when using the same utility function, the preliminary computations have to be redone once we switch to another penalty function.
• The PDE approach would become harder to implement for multidimensional problems. In addition, the increase in computational complexity can make the PDE approach infeasible.
For these two reasons, we develop in the next subsection a numerical scheme based on Monte Carlo simulations, which can be potentially useful for high-dimensional problems or in the case of complex penalty functions. 
Monte Carlo Method
In this section, we implement a Regression Monte Carlo scheme to solve the same robust portfolio allocation problems. Carriere (1996) introduced the Regression Monte Carlo approach to value the optimal stopping time for any Markovian process in discrete time. In particular, he used nonparametric regression techniques. Later, Tsitsiklis and Van Roy (2001) and Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) used a similar scheme with ordinary least squares (a.k.a. Least Squares Monte Carlo) to value American options, respectively by value iteration and by performance iteration (see for example Denault and Simonato (2017) ). Since then, Regression Monte Carlo has become a popular tool in option pricing and more generally for solving discrete-time stochastic control problems in finite horizon.
First of all, we discretize the time interval T = 1 into N time steps with a constant step size ∆t = T N . Using the Euler scheme on the logarithm of the state variable, one obtains the following dynamics for the discrete-time wealth X n :
and the discretized form of our value is
As we have proved in Section 5, this value function satisfies the DPP:
Control Randomization
Inspired by the Dynamic Programming Principle, we can start from the known terminal condition and compute the value functions backward in time recursively. Equation (48) involves a conditional expectation, which cannot be computed explicitly. Instead, one can for example use least square regression to approximate E v(n + 1, X n+1 ) F n with a polynomial basis function. The obstacle in the implementation is that we are not able to simulate the paths X n forward, since the dynamics of the state variable depends on the uncertain controls. Following Kharroubi et al. (2014) , one way to tackle this problem is an initial randomization of the controls, i.e., we choose an arbitrary initial distribution for the controls and simulate the X n with these dummy α n and σ 2 n , before including these dummy controls in the regressors of the least-squares regressions.
Proofs of the convergence and error bounds for standard Regression Monte Carlo are available in Clé-ment et al. (2002) and Beutner et al. (2013) for example. In the case of controlled dynamics, Kharroubi et al. (2015) analyzed the time-discretization error, and Kharroubi et al. (2014) investigated the projection error generated by approximating the conditional expectation by basis functions for the control randomization scheme. Recently, alternative randomization schemes have been proposed in the literature, such as Ludkovski and Maheshwari (2019) , Balata and Palczewski (2018) , Bachouch et al. (2018) or Shen and Weng (2019) , which are more amenable to comprehensive convergence proofs, see Balata and Palczewski (2017) and Huré et al. (2018) . Nevertheless, the classical control randomization scheme retains some unique advantages, such as the ease with which it can handle switching costs, as shown in Zhang et al. (2019) .
For the choice of basis function φ, we can use a polynomial function in X n , α n , σ 2 n , and let φ = K k=0 β k φ k . Once we complete the regression, we can approximate the conditional expected value function E v(n + 1, X n+1 ) F n in (48) by φ(β; X n , α n , σ 2 n ). For the mth simulation path, we can find the optimal controls by:σ
The complete process is shown in Algorithm (2).
Logarithmic Utility Function
We also demonstrate two examples for this method. When the utility function is logarithmic and the penalty function is F (σ
2 , we choose the following basis function
To find the optimal controls, we differentiate λ 0 F (σ
with respect to α n and σ 2 n , then we can get the optimal controls by solving the following polynomial equation
With β 4 < 0, there exists a real positive root. We can see the optimal controls are constants for each step, being independent of the state variable X n , this is the same as our observation in the analytical solution.
We used M = 5 × 10 6 paths, T = 1 and step size ∆t = Figures 4 and 6 show that, as in Kharroubi et al. (2014) , the value function estimated at the end of the backward loop serves as an upper bound for the true value, while the one obtained from the forward resimulation serves as a lower bound and has a smaller error than the upper bound. Figure 5 shows that both the PDE and Monte Carlo approaches converge to the true value in this example.
Power Utility Function
When the utility function is U (X T ) = 
To find the optimal controls, we differentiate λ 0 F (σ 2 n )∆t+ K k=0 β k n+1 φ k (X n, α n , σ n ) and then polynomial equation (50) for each path. We can see the optimal controlsα n andσ n depend on X n in this case. 
Figure (7) shows Monte Carlo and finite difference approximations for a range of drifts µ, with x 0 = 5, λ 0 = 10, r = 0.015, M = 5 × 10 6 , N = 65. We can see that the PDE estimates lie within the Monte Carlo bounds and that the forward simulation values almost overlap the PDE estimations. Although we do not have the analytical solution for this power utility case, these plots suggest that we are able to estimate the true values accurately with both Control Randomization and Finite Difference.
In both the logarithmic and power utility cases, the forward resimulation always performs better than the backward loop estimates. That is because the forward resimulation only suffers from one source of T error, the optimal control estimation, while the backward regression suffers more directly from regression error (see Kharroubi et al. (2014) ). So the forward simulation result is a better estimator of the true value and is the one we use for comparison with the analytical and PDE approaches.
From the results above, we can see that for these robust portfolio allocation problems with one single risky asset, both PDE and Monte Carlo methods provide accurate estimates, with the PDE estimates being slightly better overall. Both methods can be considered for solving robust portfolio allocation problems in practice. Some difficulties with the Monte Carlo approach are the choice of the basis and the number of Monte Carlo paths needed for a stable convergence. Still, the Monte Carlo would be the method of choice for more realistic portfolio allocation with multiple risky assets (see Zhang et al. (2019) ), as the PDE approach could easily become computationally intractable in this situation. 
